
### Aircraft Survivability:

### A Look into the Crystal Ball (A Composite Sketch)

October 21, 1997

To:






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#### **Equal Factors**

"Many factors influence aircraft survivability. Detection and tracking, susceptibility, performance and agility, and types of weapons used.

All play a role, as do an aviator's skills and the effectiveness of his tactics. But even if all our susceptibility reduction techniques work perfectly, the odds are we will still take some hits.

Therefore, minimizing physical vulnerability is an equally important factor in the overall survivability equation."

Rear Admiral John F. Calvert PEO Tactical A/C Navy Assistant Secretary, RDA A/C Survivability magazine September 1990, p. 6

#### Misperceptions About Aircraft Survivability

- 1. Reducing aircraft vulnerability always has significant weight penalties.
- 2. Susceptibility reduction does not constitute the addition of significant weight.

### Misperceptions About Aircraft Vulnerability

(continued)

- 3. Vulnerability reduction and susceptibility reduction are mutually exclusive.
- 4. Aircraft always will be flying when subjected to threats.

### Misperceptions About Aircraft Vulnerability

(continued)

- 5. We won't get hit.
- 6. Vulnerability reduction applies only to damage caused by combat.


### Misperceptions About Aircraft Vulnerability

(continued)

- 7. There is no need to quantify vulnerability is one sufficiently can quantify susceptibility.
- 8. An aircraft hit is an aircraft killed.

### GROWING USE OF NON-METALLIC MATERIALS

- O INADEQUATE DATA BASE
- O DANGERS OF EXTRAPOLATION FROM METALLIC DATA BASE AND FROM LOW VELOCITY IMPACTS ON COMPOSITES
- O DIFFICULTIES IN DIAGNOSING VULNERABILITY (E.G. DELAMINATION)
- O ADDED COST OF MANUFACTURE
- O ADDED COST OF MAINTENANCE
- O ADDED SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RF AND LIGHTNING DAMAGE



Year

#### **INCREASING USE OF COST / BENEFIT**

- O UNDER-ESTIMATION OF BENEFITS
- O VALUE OF HUMAN LIVES SAVED OFTEN NOT INCLUDED
- O NO EXISTING METHOD IS ABLE TO CAPTURE THE VERY REAL BUT NON-QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS

## Quantifying the Value of a Life

The Department of Transportation uses several methods:

- 1. Lifetime earning power lost to the family.
- 2. Economic loss to the organization from which the individual came.
- 3. Anticipated amount of money an insurance company would award if life was lost.
- 4. Punitive costs expected to be paid by an agency found at fault for loss of life.

#### **VULNERABILITY T&E PAYOFFS**

# INSIGHTS & FIXES YIELD NOT ONLY REDUCED ATTRITION IN COMBAT ALSO YIELDS

- O MORE DURABLE ROBUST A/C IN PEACETIME
- O LONGER A/C LIFESPAN
- O HIGHER TOLERANCE TO FOD, BIRDSTRIKES
- O HIGH TOLERANCE TO HARD LANDINGS
- O INSIGHTS WHICH CAN RESULT IN BETTER TACTICS (DIFFERENT COMBAT EXPOSURES)
- O DESIGN LESSONS FOR APPLICATION TO FUTURE AIRCRAFT
- O BATTLE DAMAGE AND REPAIR INSIGHTS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES
- O ADDED DISCIPLINE TO THE T&E PROCESS
- O DATA TO REVISE / CORRECT / CALIBRATE M&S TOOLS FOR BOTH FUTURE DESIGNS & DIAGNOSTICS & BETTER DIAGNOSTIC TOOLS FOR ASSESSMENT OF PAST A/C FAILURES

#### **GROWING RELIANCE ON STEALTH**

- O LESS TRADE SPACE LEFT FOR VULNERABILITY REDUCTION
- O MANY STEALTH MATERIALS NOT OPTIMIZED FOR STRENGTH
- O ADDED WEIGHT TO ACHIEVE LO
- O POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGHS IN TARGET ACQUISITION COULD NEGATE STEALTH
- O LITTLE TO NO PAYOFF IN PEACETIME
- O HEAVY MAINTENANCE BURDEN
- O SMALL HITS LARGE RCS GROWTH
- o COSTLY INVESTMENTS IN STEALTH LEAVING LESS \$ LEFT FOR VULNERABILITY REDUCTION TRADES

# Stealth According to Kasich

(continued)

- Stealth is not invulnerability or invisibility. It is management of the aircraft's signature.
- Just as there is no "free lunch," Stealth is a compromise.
- The stealthier an aircraft, the more likely it is to degrade other desirable combat characteristics, such as speed, maneuverability or payload.
- Stealth is inherently expensive and difficult to maintain; the coating degrades with each mission.
   Stealth is not an all aspect cloak of invisibility. It is optimized to defeat radars ahead of the aircraft, but is less effective from other angles."

John R. Kasich Washington Post July 19, 1995

# Stealth According to Kasich

(continued)

Historically, weight growth/cost growth has been attributed unjustifiably to primarily vulnerability reduction.

"The risk/benefit trade space for stealth also has very significant procurement cost, weight, performance and maintenance penalties, which must be integral to any cost/benefit study."

### GROWTH OF "PEACETIME VULNERABILITY" LOSSES

- O BIRD STRIKES
- O LIGHTNING STRIKES
- O WIRE STRIKES
- O FOD
- O TRAINING ACCIDENTS


#### **HEAVIER RELIANCE ON MANEUVER**

- O GROWING G-LOADING (BOTH + AND -) ON AIRFRAME
- O GROWING G-LOADING (BOTH + AND -) ON PILOT(S) (GLOC / ALOC IMPLICATIONS)

### CHANGING NATURE OF THE THREAT

- O NOT JUST BIGGER, BETTER, FASTER
- O FROM BULLETS TO SMART BULLETS
- O FROM MISSILES TO SMART MISSILES
- O FROM BALLISTIC TOWARD DIRECTED ENERGY
  - O EMERGENCE OF "NICHE WARFARE"
- O SOFT KILLS BECOMING AS CRITICAL AS HARD KILLS

### Scope of LFT&E Threat Considerations



#### Future Trends in LFT&E

\* New systems are becoming more complex:

**Computer-based + Light weight** 

Easier shock kills

\* Testing needs to rethink what it is trying to find out:

Live Fire Test design must account for the "soft" kills and partial kills not Live Fire and Brimstone

**Live Fire Testing** 



**Live Fire & Brimstone Testing** 

### TREND TOWARD MORE INTERNALLY STOWED MUNITIONS

- O INCREASES STEALTH AND RANGE
- O SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASES A/C VULNERABILITY
- O A/C MUST BE TREATED AS TOTAL SYSTEM INCLUDING STOWED MUNITIONS

#### **HEAVIER RELIANCE ON M&S**

- O MODELS STILL INADEQUATE TO PREDICT VULNERABILITY, AT THE COMPONENT LEVEL, LET ALONE AT THE FULL-UP SYSTEM-LEVEL
- O INADEQUATE ARCHITECTURES TO YIELD MEASURABLE AND COMPARABLE OUTPUT METRICS
- O SOME PHENOMENA NOT MODELED ADEQUATELY OR AT ALL (FOLLOW-THROUGH FIRE, ULLAGE, HYRDO RAM, SPALL, RICOCHET, RF. ETC)

#### DOT&E/LFT&E SUPPORT TO M&S

#### 1. LFT&E / JLF

o SHORTER TERM
o WEAPON / PLATFORM SPECIFIC
o TEST DRIVEN w/ PRE-SHOT PREDICTIONS
o PRIMARILY FROM EMPIRICALLY BASED
MODELS

#### **2.** TILV

o MID-TERM
o MORE TARGET GENERIC (A/C, SHIPS, COMBAT
VEHICLES)
o TEST & MODEL DRIVEN

#### 3. DOT&E/LFT&E / DOE ASCI MOA

o LONGER TERM
o MOST TARGET INDEPENDENT
o "PHYSICS-BASED MODELS" VALIDATED BY
REALISTIC LFT&E TEST OPPORTUNITIES

### MOVE TOWARD COMMERCIAL SPECS AND STANDARDS


- O LESSONS BEHIND EXTANT MILSPECS NOT OFTEN AVAILABLE OR HEEDED
- O POTENTIAL LIABILITY TO A/C
  MANUFACTURERS IF ATTRIBUTABLE LOSS
  OF A/C AND/OR LIFE TO "POOR" DESIGN
- O PEACETIME MENTALITY PERVADING A/C MINDSET

### MOVE TOWARD MARGINALLY STABLE / AERODYNAMICALLY UNSTABLE AIRCRAFT

- O IMPACT OF DAMAGE TO CONTROL SURFACES
- O EFFECT OF DAMAGE / DEGRADATION TO FLIGHT CONTROLS & SOFTWARE, POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL
- O AI IMPLICATIONS

#### **Objectives of LFT&E**

- To enable the Secretary to make informed system acquisition decisions
- To gain insights into potential design flaws so that they can be corrected before entering full-rate production
- To ensure that knowledge of system survivability and lethality is based on realistic testing of the system configured for combat against expected threats
- Primary emphasis on testing vulnerability with respect to potential user casualties
  - Individual Soldiers
  - Armor Crews
  - Aircraft Crews
  - Ship Crews
  - Tactical Vehicle Crews



### NEW LFT&E AND TRAINING INITIATIVE (LFT&TI)

- O ADDRESSES SECDEF'S T&E THRUSTS
- O SUPPORT FROM CONGRESS INITIATED IN FY97 AND GROWING
- O TAKING LFT&E RESULTS, TESTS,
  OPPORTUNITIES, INSIGHTS AND PROVIDE
  THESE TO THE TRAINING COMMUNITY FOR
  THEIR BENEFIT
- O TAKING TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES TO GATHER FURTHER LFT&E INSIGHTS

#### LFT Payoffs


- Provides the data necessary to make fully informed acquisition decisions
- Provides insights into vulnerability and/or lethality of systems in development
- Adds discipline to the test design process
- Provides battle damage and repair insights for training
- Provides spare parts stockage level data
- Teaches tactics lessons
- · Feeds operational test assessment
- Provides necessary input to overall survivability analysis
- Provides basis for  $P_K$ 's for force-on-force models (procurement mix)
- Leverages future weapons designs
- · Produces data used as inputs to training simulators

It saves lives!

### Change

Change is inevitable, except from a vending machine.





### THINK ASYMMETRICALLY

#### **OUTLOOK**

#### A PERSONAL VIEW

"PEACE IS THE TIME BETWEEN CONFLICT WHEN NATIONS TAKE TIME TO RELOAD"